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The purpose of this paper is to identify characteristics of the complexities and organizational 
limits that science-based industries in Japan are facing, to clarify the causes and effects of those 
characteristics and to show how they are related to the recent decline in global competitiveness in these 
industries. The microlithography industry is used for this purpose as a typical example of science-
based industries. In this industry, Nikon and Canon were quite dominant until around the mid 1990s, 
while ASML of the Netherlands began to increase its competitive strength rapidly in the mid 1990s. 
The paper introduces the new concept of “interim modularity” vis-à-vis “ex ante modularity” à la 
Baldwin and Clark (2000) to explain how ASML tries to cope effectively with the drastically 
increasing complexity of such a technology. The concept of interim modularity is defined as the 
communication benefits induced by the modular architecture during trial-and-error development 
processes, no matter how incomplete such architecture may be. The paper emphasizes that extremely 
complex tools like microlithography require interim  modularity to effectively orchestrate the 
dispersion of specialized knowledge and know-how over a wide range of professionals inside and 
outside of corporations and that interim modularity is more effectively pursued by ASML than by 
Nikon or Canon. The paper also indicates that the insufficient cognition of the importance of interim 
modularity has been widely weakening the competitiveness especially in Japanese science-based 
industries. 
 
**Hiroyuki Chuma is Professor at the Institute of Innovation Research, Hitotsubashi University, 2-1, 
Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-8603, Japan (e-mail: ce00005@srv.cc.hit-u.ac.jp); and Faculty Fellow 
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1.  Introduction 
There is an interesting paper (Helper, 2000) that advocates the importance of inductive 
thinking to economists with a bias for deductive thinking by saying that “You can observe a lot just by 
watching.” Unfortunately, it has been virtually impossible to experience the  delightfulness of 
manufacturing without some comprehension of the production systems per se. This is particularly true 
in science-based industries.
1  Take the case of highly automated state-of-the-art semiconductor 
factories (or fabs). No matter how close an observer, clad in dust-proof suit, may stand to observe 
various production processes, that person will have no clue as to what is taking place unless he or she 
has some basic understanding of the tasks being done at molecular and atomic levels. This failure to 
understand applies not only to people ignorant in science but also to quite a few technicians, engineers, 
and scientists, although there may be some differences in degree. 
Under this general climate, scientific and technological innovations have constantly been 
taking place in various fields at such astonishing rates that it has become indispensable for people to 
maintain specialized knowledge at advanced levels and to integrate this specialized knowledge on a 
large scale, dispersed over finely divided disciplines. This requirement stems primarily from frequent 
incidents of complex phenomena that are hard to reproduce. In addition, this situation has been made 
more complex over the years by two factors: the globalization of various markets, due to rapid 
advancements in transportation and communication systems, and consumers’ diversified and upgraded 
                                                        
1  An industry is called science-based if the time lags between scientific discoveries and their industrial applications are very short. 
Pharmaceutical, biotechnology, semiconductor, and fine chemical industries and the like fall into this category (see Goto and Odagiri, 
2003).  
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preferences brought on by affluence. In reality, as Adam Smith predicted, the breadths and depths of 
markets are being broadened so that both markets and organizations are becoming more and more 
specialized and differentiated (Langlois, 2003; Lamoreaux, Raff and Temin, 2002). 
As the level of complexity surpasses a certain threshold, the limitations of relying on a handful 
of individuals with both specialized and integrated knowledge are suddenly exposed. This is because 
their capacities for information processing (“brain power”) hit physico-chemical limits. Once these 
individuals reach their limits, full-scale organizational management over a wide range of related areas 
becomes indispensable in order to harness the information-processing capabilities of the right people 
in the right places. Furthermore, the range that requires full-scale management is not limited to the 
various divisions within a corporation; it extends beyond corporate boundaries permanently 
(Chesbrough, 2003).  
The necessity for reaching beyond borders is particularly high in science-based industries in 
which the speed of innovation, or the “clockspeed" (Fine, 1998), is extremely rapid. In such a situation, 
we need to apply the “organization determines strategy” approach advocated by Roberts (2004) rather 
than the “strategy determines organization” approach recommended by Chandler (1962). This is 
because the optimal strategy could only be found inexpensively and quickly in an organization where 
both the rapidly changing circumstances and the appropriate knowledge are seen at a glance and are 
effectively shared with considerable certainty by the people involved across the hierarchy. 
Furthermore, the more efficiently the organization can turn the feedback loop of “organization → 
strategy → organization → strategy →…,” the more quickly it can search for preferable strategies. 
In order to construct an organization that can respond to such a high clockspeed, it is not 
sufficient for the people involved to pursue their specialized and integrated knowledge in stand-alone 
mode. Rather, this knowledge has to be autonomously shared and networked through information-
processing capabilities to handle organizational complexities holistically. It is crucial, in other words, 
to create an organization where autonomous collaboration among the people involved could encourage  




2 or self-assembly effects (Johnson and Broms, 2000).  
Creating such an “emergent” or self-assembling organization is not a simple task. Indeed, 
unless the appropriate mechanism design is adopted, the “limit of organization”
3 appears at various 
hierarchical layers, causing coordination failures in which local optimization does not lead to global 
optimization. This happens because the more autonomous the people or groups involved become, the 
more conflicts of interest occur. Furthermore, the more advanced and complex an organization is, the 
more seriously it tends to induce vexing problems such as “failure to recognize the extent of 
externalities,” “lack of intrinsic motivation to recognize them,” and “failure in communication to cope 
with them.”  
The purpose of this paper is threefold: to identify characteristics of the complexities and 
organizational limits that science-based industries in Japan are facing, to clarify the causes and effects 
of those characteristics and to show how they are related to the recent decline in global 
competitiveness in these industries. The microlithography industry is used for this purpose as a typical 
example of science-based industries. 
There are four primary reasons for choosing the microlithography industry. (1) 
Microlithography is often regarded as an ultimate precision tool in human history with “integral 
architecture” (Fujimoto, 2001)
4   and represents the quintessence of the latest scientific and 
technological knowledge. (2) Nikon and Canon, two of the most representative Japanese 
manufacturers, held insurmountable global competitiveness in this industry over the two decades 
beginning in the mid 1980s. (3) Such competitiveness has been eroding, however, since the emergence 
of ASML in the Netherlands in the late 1990s. (4) The decline in this industry goes against the 
                                                        
2 “Emergence” means that the aggregate exceeds the sums of individual capabilities within a system. 
3  “Limit of organization” here means the limit of organizational capabilities to cope with increasing complexities of technology and 
market in the sense that individual (local) optimization within an organization  does not lead to global maximization. 
4 Product architecture is called “integral” when  the total performance of final products needs post-assembly fine tuning because it could not 
be presumed even if the performance of each key component was  assured.  
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conventional wisdom that Japanese manufacturers are very good at products with integral 
architecture.
5  
  The next section of this paper provides an overview of microlithography. Section 3 describes 
the rise and fall of the microlithography industry based on world market-share data, the innovation 
speed of the state-of-the-art microlithography tools and a time-series statistical analysis. Section 4 
presents a brief historical explanation of what ASML is. Sections 5 and 6 make up the main part of the 
paper. Section 5 initially provides the technological background for ASML’s leapfrogging progress 
since the mid 1990s. Then it introduces the new concept of “interim modularity” vis-à-vis “ex ante 
modularity” à la Baldwin and Clark (2000) to explain how ASML tries to cope effectively with the 
drastically increasing complexity of such a technology. The concept of interim modularity is defined 
as the communication benefits induced by the modular architecture during trial-and-error development 
processes, no matter how incomplete such architecture may be. The paper emphasizes that extremely 
complex tools like microlithography require interim  modularity to effectively orchestrate the 
dispersion of specialized knowledge and know-how over a wide range of professionals inside and 
outside of corporations. Section 6 shows that, based on evidence about ASML’s ways of collaboration 
in SPIE
6 and ASML’s development methods for embedded control software, interim modularity is 
more effectively pursued by ASML than by Nikon or Canon. Finally, Section 7 summarizes the paper 
and provides several implications for Japanese science-based industries.  
 
                                                        
5 Nikon, Canon and ASML were the primary subjects for this paper and, due to their helpful cooperation, intensively investigated. Hitachi 
High Technology (formally Nissei Sangyo) was included in ASML as the distributor of ASML tools in Japan. Our field research was also 
done for ULTRATEC (California), which is the sole U.S. microlithography manufacturer. Afterward, the range of field research was 
expanded to include domestic and foreign semiconductor chip and material manufacturers and public and private research consortiums. To 
be more specific, Epson, NEC (including NEC Electronics), Trecenti UMCJ, Spansion Japan (formally Fujitsu-AMD), Sony, Renesas, 
Hitachi, TSMC, Winbond, UMC, Elpida, Toyota (Hirose Plant), Toshiba, JSR, Tokyo Ohka Kogyou, MIRAI STARC and others were 
added.     
6 Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers  
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2.  Overview of Microlithography 
2.1  Basic Structure of Microlithography 
Microlithography can be simply defined as a special copying machine that prints integrated 
circuit (IC) patterns in a photomask onto a (silicone) wafer through a projection lens. The basic 
structure is shown in Figure 1. This figure shows (a) the reticle (or photomask) stage upon which a 
photomask is placed, (b) the projection lens used to project reduced IC patterns in a photomask onto a 
wafer and (c) the wafer stage upon which a wafer is placed.  










Source of data: Modified based on ASML’s public presentation 
 
Currently, there are two types of microlithography: a stepper (step and repeat) type and a 
scanner (step and scan) type. The former uses all of a projection lens to project and expose all the IC 
patterns in a photomask at once, whereas the latter uses only the best part, the “cream,” of a projection 
lens to transfer a portion of the IC patterns in a photomask, little by little. The scanner has been 
developed to meet chipmakers’ ever-demanding need for miniaturization due to Moore’s law.
7 For the 
scanner, only the cream of the projection lens could deliver the required optimum performance. 
Accordingly, while only a wafer stage is needed to move in a stepper, both reticle and wafer stages are 
                                                        
7 The experiential law first observed by G. Moore from INTEL as an exponential growth in the number of transistors per integrated circuit 
(IC):  the doubling of transistors every couple of years. For details, see http://www.intel.com/research/silicon/mooreslaw.htm.  
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needed to move in a scanner, by which very precise and synchronous movements can be guaranteed.  
Performance of both wafer and reticle stages is critical to total performance of scanner-type 
microlithography. The faster the stepping speed is, the higher the throughput. The more precisely the 
positioning of stages and lens can be controlled, the more significantly both resolution
8 and the overlay 
accuracy
9 can be enhanced. To get a better-focused image on a wafer, a precise alignment unit is 
indispensable in attaining precise measurements, adjustments and corrections (Levinson, 2001). 
 
2.2 Basic Performance and Rapidly Advancing Complexity 
Basic performance of microlithography is normally expressed by three attributes: (a) 
resolution, (b) overlay accuracy and (c) throughput (productivity). Among them, Rayleigh’s equation 
below is used to indicate (maximally attainable) resolution (Levinson, 2001). 
(1) Resolution = k1λ/NA,  
where k1 is a constant value determined by various exposure-related process conditions, λ is a 
wavelength of the light source and NA (Numerical Aperture) is a kind of brightness of the projection 
lens. Previously, mercury lamps were commonly utilized, but now laser beams, called DUVs (Deep 
Ultra Violet), are in frequent use. Overlay accuracy is heavily dependent upon the metrological and 
controllable precision of both the stage and alignment systems. Throughput, which is measured by the 
number of wafers processed per hour, is heavily dependent on the feeding speed of stages and auto-
focusing speed of the projection lens.  
Complexity of microlithography has been increasing rapidly with advancement in both 
hardware and software, as can be seen in Table 1.
10 According to this table, the lithography tools 
                                                        
8 The minimum line width transferred on a silicone wafer. 
9 Interlayer alignment precision when multiple layers of integrated circuit patterns are transferred on a silicone wafer. 
10 PAS5000 shown in the table is assumed to be the i-line PAS5500/50 released in 1989, based on official data available from ASML. In 
addition, the KrF Scanner AS5500/500 released in 1997 was the first scanner in the PAS5500 series. Twinscan was released  only after late 
2000.  
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manufactured in 2000 were equipped with more than six times the number of CPUs, and 
approximately eight times the number of sensors and motors as the tools manufactured in 1989. 
Moreover, FPGA (Filed Programmable Gate Array) was not used at all before 1990, but around 2000 
tools were equipped with 500 units of FPGA. These facts indicate that hardware complexity has been 
increasing very rapidly over the last decade. The software complexity has also grown rapidly. One 
kind of software codes (Lines of Source Codes) has increased almost sixfold over the decade, while 
the other kind of software codes has grown by more than twenty-two times in size over five to seven 
years. Thus, both software and hardware complexity are becoming more and more difficult to cope 
with. In fact, ASML’s previous president and CEO believes in “Dunn’s law” associated with 
“Moore’s law”: that a software development team will double in size every four years (Dunn, 2002). 
 













Initial Sale 1989 1996* 1997* 2000 2001* 2003*
Sampling
Frequency (MHz)
3.85 2.5 3.3 5
Processor (CPU)
Frequency (MHz)
40 60 60 350
# Processors
（FPGA）
8 （0） 25 (200) 50　（500）
# Axes 3 17 24 36
# Sensors 50 150 400
# Actuaters 40 100 300




200 millions 900 millions 1250 millios
(2)Lines of Source
Codes
20000 140000 260000 450000
Astarisks (*) mean the estimation.  
Source of data: Compiled by the author from public data available from ASML and other agencies.  
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Onvlee et al., (2003) and Burntink et al. (2004) have conducted a structural analysis of the 
embedded control software of ASML scanners. The software is reported to consist of more than ten 
million lines of C source codes. These researchers guess that 20 to 30 percent of the total source codes 
m u s t  b e  “ c r o s s c u t t i n g ”  i n  t h a t  e a c h  e m b e d d e d  m o d u l e  i s  n o t  s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  b u t  r u n s  r i s k s  o f  
interdependencies over various modules, and they believe that reducing such crosscutting codes could 
be quite effective in further enhancing the performance of ASML scanners. 
 
3.  Rise and Fall in the Microlithography Industry 
3.1 Arrival of Nikon’s Stepper 
The first commercial Japanese stepper was released by Nikon in 1980. This stepper is said to 
be the fruit of a VLSI (Very Large-scale Integration)  Research Project that began in 1976 as a 
government-private joint project (Tarui and SEAJ, 1991). In those days, GCA (U.S.A.), which had 
successfully launched the first commercial stepper in the world in 1976, almost monopolized the world 
stepper market (VLSI, 1992).
11 Nikon managed to take over the top position in the Japanese market as 
early as 1983. Nikon advanced without resistance since then and captured the number one global 
market share by 1990. At the same time (1983), Canon-- which had once conquered the world 
microlithography market by its fully automated proximity aligners
12-- turned its attention to steppers, 
taking advantage of their superb in-house optical and precision machine fabrication technologies. 
From that time until around 1995, Nikon and Canon together held between 70and 75 percent of the 
global market share.  
 
                                                        
11 The projection lens had been supplied by Carl Zeiss SMT of Oberkochen, Germany. 
12 Prior to steppers, IC patterns were transformed from masks to wafer by contact, proximity or projection printing. Proximity aligners use 
the proximity printing for which the mask is placed in close proximity (about 10µm) to the wafer. For details, see Henderson and Clark 
(1990), Hirota (2002), Levinson (2001) or Wolf (2004). According to VLSI (1992), even in 1984, aligners occupied 39 percent of the 
world microlithography markets, while steppers occupied 55 percent.    
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3.2 Emergence of ASML 
Just as the Japanese semiconductor industry started to lose its competitiveness in the global 
market in the early 1990s, a dramatic change in the global microlithography market took place  (see 
Figure 2). ASML (in the Netherlands) began to make its mark. ASML had held less than 10 percent of 
the global microlithography market in 1990, controlling less than Hitachi at that time.
13 ASML’s 
market share grew to 14 percent by 1995 and continued to grow  to about 30 percent in 2000. By 2002 
ASML was the largest microlithography manufacturer in the world, capturing more than 50 percent of 
the global market. ASML, on the one hand, and Nikon and Canon, on the other, have been engaged in 
a dead-heat race since 2002.
14 













 Source of data: Annual reports of the respective corporations and other public information. 
 
The weakening competitiveness of Nikon and Canon compared with ASML can be also seen 
from the differences in the speed of innovation about state-of-the-art ArF scanners
15 (see Table 2). 
                                                        
13 Hitachi eventually withdrew from the market in 1994. 
14 ASML acquired SVGL (U.S.A.). The aggregate market share of the two companies, in fact, exceeded that of Nikon in 2000. 
15 Microlithography using 193 nm wavelength argon fluoride laser.  
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According to this table, the speed of innovation by ASML tended to exceed that by Nikon or Canon 
after the resolution was enhanced beyond 0.1 µm. 
 
Table 2. Comparison of launch dates for commercial ArF scanners by Nikon, Canon and ASML 
 
Source of data: Companies’ annual reports and other publicly available documents. 
 
It should be noted here that, in Japan and the United States, Nikon filed suits against ASML 
for the infringement of seven basic Nikon patents. The technologies involved have all been applied 
 
140 φ300 0.065  0.92  26×33 1/4 ArF NSR-S308F Nikon 2004 
122 φ300 0.065  0.93  26×33 1/4 ArF TWINSCAN XT:1400 ASML 2004 
114 φ300 0.065  0.85  26×33 1/4 ArF TWINSCAN XT:1250B ASML 2004 
135（参考） φ200 0.090  0.75  26×33 1/4 ArF PAS5500/1150C ASML 2004
112 φ300 0.080  0.85  26×33 1/4 ArF NSR-307E Nikon 2003 
140 φ300 0.080  0.85  26×33 1/4 ArF FPA-6000AS4 Canon 2003 
103 φ300 0.080  0.85  26×33 1/4 ArF TWINSCAN AT:1200B ASML 2003 
85 φ300 0.100  0.78  25×33 1/4 ArF NSR-S306C Nikon 2002 
105 φ300 0.100  0.75  26×33 1/4 ArF FPA-5000AS3 Canon 2002 
93 φ300 0.100  0.75  26×33 1/4 ArF TWINSCAN AT:1100B ASML 2001 
90（参考） φ200 0.100  0.75  26×33 1/4 ArF PAS5500/1100 ASML 2001
88 φ300 0.110  0.70  26×33 1/4 ArF FPA-5000AS2 Canon 2001 
78 φ300 0.110  0.68  25×33 1/4 ArF NSR-S305B Nikon 2001 
φ300 0.130  0.60  26×33 1/4 ArF FPA-5000AS1 Canon 1999
60（参考） φ200 0.130  0.63  26×33 1/4 ArF PAS5500/950 ASML 1999
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frequently in the latest ASML microlithography tools, called TWINSCAN.
16 These lawsuits were 
resolved in September 2004 after ASML and Zeiss (Carl Zeiss SMT AG.) agreed to pay Nikon $147 
million (US) as license fees. As is exemplified in Figure 3, Nikon still has superior element 
technologies, but the number of U.S. patents assigned to ASML or the ASML coalition (ASML, Zeiss 
and Philips) has increased significantly since the mid 1990s. 
17 
 
3.3 Is This Weakening Competitiveness Temporary? 
More than a few semiconductor-industry specialists in Japan are still quite optimistic about the 
technological potential of Nikon and Canon, maintaining as follows: “The decreasing world market 
share of Nikon or Canon has been caused not by the weakened potential competitiveness of Nikon or 
Canon but by one of the Japanese chipmakers that u s e d  t o  b e  t h e  g r e a t e s t  u s e r  o f  J a p a n e s e  
microlithography tools. Therefore, the decrease that has occurred since the mid 1990s is likely to be 
temporary.” The relevance of this “temporary” hypothesis will be tested in this section, based on time-
series data and using statistical analyses where the share variable of each microlithography 
manufacturer (ASML, Canon or Nikon) between 1986 and 2003 is regressed by various explanatory 
variables, as follows: 
 
) ( ) ( _
) 2 _ ) ( ( ) 2 _ ) ( ( ) ( ) 2 (
t t DUV d




+ ∆ + ∆ + =
 
Figure 3. Transition in acquired U.S. patents by ASML, Canon, and Nikon 
                                                        
16 Specifically, according to Thin Film Manufacturing (2002), these were RET(resolution enhancement technology) patent (US-563821, 
US-6233041), scan control patent (US-5473410), stage vibration isolation reaction frame patent (US-6271640, US-6008500), and counter-
balance mechanism patent (US-6255796, US-6323935). 
17 Based on the Delphion (www.delphion.com), where the following Boolean search was conducted: g-line or i-line or KrF or ArF or duv 
or "deep uv" or "deep ultra violet" or euv or "extreme uv" or "extreme ultraviolet" or "x-ray"）*（projection and exposure or lithography） or 
multilayer*mirror). In determining these terms of search, I had a valuable advice from the executive scientist from one of the 
microlithography makers investigated in this paper.   











1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 19992 0 0 02 0 0 12 0 0 22 0 0 3
Nikon Canon ASML ASML Group
 
 
In equation (2), Yi(t) is the transformed share variable that takes a real number. More 
concretely, Yi(t) is defined as log (yi(t)/(1- yi(t))) where yi(t) is the actual world microlithography share 
of manufacturer i at period t. For simplicity, subscript i is abbreviated in equation (2). Moreover, 
∆WsemiMSize(t), ∆JapanSemiMSize(t), d_DUV(t), or ε(t) is, respectively, the rate of increase in total 
world semiconductor shipments (US $), the rate of increase in the ratio of Japanese semiconductor 
shipments in the world (US $), a DUV dummy variable, or an error term in period t. Subscript “2”  in 
∆WsemiMSize(t) or ∆JapanSemiMSize(t) in equation 2 means that a two-year lag is taken for each 
variable. d_DUV(t) is defined to be unity if t is greater than 1997 and zero otherwise. This is because, 
as is well known, the number of shipments in DUV steppers and/or scanners exceeded the number of 
shipments in the other types of older tools for the first time in the world in 1998. ε(t) is a random 
variable that has a zero expected value and variance of σ
２. As typical time series data, {ε(t)} is 
assumed to follow a first order autoregressive (AR(1)) process. Hence, a GLS (generalized least 
square) method is applied in the actual estimation of equation 2.  
The estimation results are shown in Table 3. The share of ASML is positively and highly 
significantly influenced by both ∆WsemiMSize(t)_2 and the DUV dummy variable, whereas the share  
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of Nikon is negatively and highly significantly influenced by these variables. In addition, as is 
expected, ∆JapanSemiMSize(t)_2 is positively and highly significant for Nikon but not for ASML. 
The results for Canon are quite different from ASML and Nikon: both ∆WsemiMSize(t)_2 and the 
DUV dummy variable are not significant. Only ∆JapanSemiMSize(t)_2 is moderately significant for 
Canon.   
Judging from these results, it could be surmised that the decrease in Nikon and Canon’s share 
of the world microlithography market is partly due to the decrease in the competitiveness of the 
Japanese semiconductor industry itself. At the same time, however, both the increase in world 
semiconductor shipments and the new era of DUV tools’ dominance have a significantly negative 
impact on Nikon’s share and partly on Canon’s. Accordingly, the decreasing trend for them must also 
be caused by other structural factors. 
 
Table 3. Time-Series Analysis of the Transition in World Microlithography Market Share 
Prais-Winsten AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t| Coef. t P>|t|
Company Name ASML Nikon Canon
wsemi_msize_2 1.08 9.89 0.00 -0.24 -3.79 0.00 0.29 1.97 0.07
Δjapan_semi_ratio_2 -3.69 -1.68 0.12 2.71 2.75 0.02 3.87 2.16 0.05
d_duv 0.41 2.45 0.03 -0.36 -4.42 0.00 -0.21 -0.95 0.36
constant -13.74 -11.45 0.00 2.65 3.67 0.00 -4.53 -2.74 0.02
r h o 0 . 1 80 . 0 40 . 2 5
R - S q u a r e d 0 . 9 20 . 8 70 . 5 1
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.81 1.93 1.78
Regression with robust standard errors
Legend
wsemi_msize: World Semiconductor Shipment (by WSTS)
Δjapan_semi_ratio: Japan's Ration in wsemi_msize
subscript 2 (_2) means "2 years lagged variable of the wsemi_msize or Δjapan_semi_ratio)




4. What Is ASML? 
ASML was established by people who spun off from Philips in 1984. One can trace the roots  
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of ASML back to the period when Philips developed its unique in-house stepper in 1973.
18 Philips 
itself commercialized the first stepper in 1980.
19 At the onset, ASML took the form of a joint venture 
by ASM International (established in 1968) and Philips Electronics. In the interim, ASM International 
could not afford to maintain a stake in ASML, which had been losing money constantly around that 
time, and was forced to concentrate on its main business (semiconductor thin film tools like CVD 
(Chemical Vapor Deposition)). Thus, ASM International sold half of the stocks it owned to Philips and 
the other half to a Dutch bank. Thereafter, until 1988, ASML continued to be a subsidiary of Philips. 
Actually Philips owned about 60 percent of all ASML stock around this period.   
ASML was listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and NASDAQ in 1996. Increased volume of 
sales to foundries
20  in Taiwan like TSMC (Philips’ alliance) was a primary factor in the firm’s 
success.
21 Philips had owned about 35 percent of all ASML stock when ASML went public.
22 After 
that the ratio Philips owned steadily declined to about 27 percent in 1997, 7 percent in 2000 and less 
than 4 percent in 2003. Despite such a low stockholding ratio, Philips still maintains control over 
corporate governance of ASML.
23 It is also interesting that U.S. investment companies like FRM and 
Capital Group International hold over 25 percent of the outstanding ASML stocks having [that have?] 
no voting rights.  
An examination of profiles of the current ASML board members shows them to be well 
qualified as highly advanced specialists in the related science, technology or marketing. Indeed, the 
                                                        
18 More concretely, the first patent (US3602591) for a step & repeat principle in the United States was awarded to Philips in 1971 while the 
first one （JP53039075A2） in Japan was awarded to Hitachi in 1978. 
19 This was introduced by the researcher at the Philips Research Lab. in the SPIE proceedings in 1980 (see Wittekoek, 1980). 
20 Fabrication-specific semiconductor manufacturers. 
21 ASLM market share in Taiwan has been about 50 percent since the mid 1990s. 
22 According to U.S. SEC data, just prior to being publicly traded (in other words, in 1995), Philips sold to FRM (a U.S. investment 
company) by mutual consent the shares it still owned, which represented a little more than 13 percent of the outstanding shares at that time. 
23 This must be mainly because of the corporate governance style used by ASML, which could be implemented easily in the Netherlands. 
For details, see the Appendix.  
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newly appointed CEO was the former executive vice president of the TV division in Thomson, the 
French appliance giant. He had also occupied important positions at Intel and DELL. The preceding 
CEO had worked for Philips, prior to joining ASML, as a director in both the consumer electronics 
and semiconductor divisions. He had also served as an executive director for ARM (G.B.) and had 
worked as a semiconductor engineer with Motorola and General Electric. He had even served as an 
outside board member for ST Microelectronics. The CEO prior to him, who served from 1990 to 1999, 
was a straight Philips-bred engineer. Of the four current vice presidents, two are engineers, one from 
Philips Semiconductor (COO) and the other from AMD. The third is a straight ASML system design 
engineer and the fourth is a finance specialist who worked for Detroit-Tohmatsu. 
 
Table 4. Profile of outside board members serving ASML 




1995 Phillips, Vice President, CEO of  Consumer
Electronics Div.




1997 TNO, CEO Same a above
Outside
Director
1996 Carl Zeiss, Chairman & CEO Max Plank Research
Institute, Committee member,
Outside 2001 IBM Electronics, Chairman, CEO, SVLG
Outside 1998 Akzo Nobel, Vice President (Finance) Outside board membership
Outside
Director
2002 Unilever, Executive Director, General Manger of
Tax Dept, (specialist on tax and legal matters)  
SVLG— Silicone Valley Lithography Group (USA) — was acquired by ASML in 2002. 
Source of data: various U.S. SEC document (F-20) 
 
As for their outside board members, the latest U.S. SEC document (F-20) lists the personal 
profiles outlined in Table 4. According to this information, all the outside board members serving 
ASML are among the best scientists, engineers and financial, legal and tax specialists in the world.  
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The close alliance between ASML and Philips/Zeiss/TNO
24 can be also inferred from this table. 
 
5.  Increasing Complexity of Microlithography and the Role of Modular Architecture 
5.1 Increasing Complexity of the Lithography Process 
When IC patterns in a photomask become extremely miniaturized, it becomes impossible for 
most of the diffracted light to pass through the projection lens. As a result, patterned images can no 
longer be focused onto a wafer. Even if the diffracted lights can manage to pass through the projection 
lens, with very dense IC patterns, the image projected onto the wafer would lose contrast and the 
boundaries between adjunct patterns could not be discerned. In order to alleviate such a problem, RET 
(Resolution Enhancement Technology) has been developed to exert tight control over the amplitude, 
phase, direction, and  possibly polarization, of emitted lights in capturing more of the diffracted 
lights.
25  
Beginning in the mid 1990s, when the demand for miniaturization in submicron order due to 
Moore’s law started to increase drastically, RET became implemented gradually, mainly with DUV 
steppers at various commercial fabs of the leading semiconductor chipmakers in the world. RET is a 
kind of technology able to lower the value of k1 in the previous Rayleigh’s equation by keeping λ and 
NA constant. Figure 4 specifies how extensively RET has been implemented. According to this figure, 
the value of k1 started to improve from the mid 1990s, in contrast to its stagnation in the early 1990s.
26  
The introduction of RET together with DUV steppers opened a new frontier for optical 
lithography tools. Yet, at the same time, tool manufacturers began to experience complex problems 
they had not confronted in the past. It became extremely difficult to ensure printing accuracy from 
original IC design patterns to actual patterns in a photomask and then from there to patterns projected 
                                                        
24  TNO is the famous nonprofit research institution on applied sciences in the Netherlands, which is more or less a huge national 
technology research institute. The microlithography division at TNO is located in Eindhoven (the Netherlands), the castle town of Philips. 
25 Schellenberg, 2004 gives a succinct description on these methods, together with the history of the process of development of the RET. 
26 RET itself has a long history. For details, see Schellenberg, 2004.  
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onto a wafer (Mori and Higashiki, 2004). DUV steppers themselves could not have been introduced 
without accidentally having the following Three Sacred Treasures simultaneously:
 27 High  Purity 
Synthetic Fused Silica Lens (only from Canon, Nikon, Zeiss group or Corning), High-energy version 
of KrF Laser (exclusively from Cymer, Komatsu, or Lambda Physik) and Chemically Amplified 
Resist (invented and developed by IBM).
28 
Figure 4. Changes of value of k1 (IBM’s case) 
 
Source of data: Liebmann et al., 2001  
What made the situation more complicated was the fact that finding the root causes of 
imprecise printing accuracy became more and more difficult. Accordingly, it became inevitable for 
microlithography manufacturers to collaborate with leading chipmakers as well as toolmakers (e.g., 
coater-developers, etchers, or resist strippers) and photomask, materials (e.g., resist, low-k or high-k 
materials), and EDA software manufacturers.
 29 In other words, as microlithography tools got closer to 
the “physico-chemical limits” (Fujimura, 2000), in order to innovate their tools effectively, these 
workers needed to unite their own element technologies with much wider and potentially more useful 
ones that existed beyond their corporate boundaries. It was at about this time that ASML made great 
leaps ahead. 
                                                        
27 Photo-sensitive materials coated on wafers. For details, see Wolf, 2004. 
28 This point is emphasized in Suzuki (2003) and in the personal communication with him. 
29 EDA means Electronic Design Automation. For the brief and quite understandable explanation of coater-developer, etchers, or resist 
strippers, low-k or high-k materials, see Wolf, 2004.  
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The fact that microlithography manufacturers had been facing the “physico-chemical limits” 
can be seen indirectly in the transition process of NA in i-line microlithography tools.
 30 This is shown 
in Figure 5, which plots NAs of newly commercialized i-line tools by Nikon, Canon and ASML. The 
figure indicates that NAs tended to be increased at roughly the same pace until 1994 and, after this 
period, flattened out and remained at the same levels thereafter. This stagnation period coincides with 
the time when KrF steppers
31 began to be dominant. Both Figure 4 and Figure 5  strongly indicate that 
the superior technologies of Nikon and Canon for NA enhancement markedly contributed to 
maintaining their absolute dominance in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
32 
 
5.2 Difficulties in Pursuing ex ante Modularity  
Quite a few people, including industry specialists and researchers, attribute the phenomenal 
success of ASML to the built-in modular architecture of ASML microlithography tools, à la Baldwin 
and Clarke (2000).
33 To be sure, “ASML final assembly plants add less than 10% value” (George, 
2002). In contrast to Nikon’s or Canon’s, ASML has the following features: (a) End-users can easily 
take out the stages for maintenance purposes. (b) The automatic calibration mechanism can fully 
guarantee that the stages that are removed will return to the previous position after such maintenance 
jobs. (c) The exchange or upgrading of the projection lens can be done with great ease on factory 
floors of the chipmakers themselves. The question is, Are these features of ASML’s modular 
architecture sufficient to support the aforementioned strength of ASML relative to Nikon or Canon? 
The answer must be, Not necessarily. 
 
                                                        
30 Machine using 360 nm wavelength mercury lamp as light source. 
31 Machine using krypton fluoride laser beam (248 nm wavelength) as light source.   
32 This is one of the reasons that GCA and Hitachi, which depended on outside sources (esp. Zeiss) for their projection lenses, eventually 
withdrew from the market. 
33 For example, see Roest and Schuurmans, 1997; George, 2002.  
  - 19 - 
 
19










1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
NA_i_Nikon NA_i_Canon NA_i_ASML
 
Source of data: publicly available data from respective manufacturers. 
 
Implementing a “perfect” modular architecture in product design generally implies that the 
total performance of the final product specified at a system-design phase can automatically be assured 
as long as the performance of each key component (called “module”) is individually assured. As 
advocated by Baldwin and Clarke (2000), such modular architecture could provide the following 
benefits: (a) expanding the range of complexity addressable, (b) extending the scope of addressable 
business risks by parallel development and production or outsourcing and (c) shortening various lead 
times by parallel development and production or outsourcing. In order for these benefits to be 
manifested, however, the modular architecture in question must be perfect. This is because the 
interface between key modules could be open or standardized to any companies that could 
manufacture the corresponding components only if it is perfect. This paper distinguishes the benefits 
induced by perfect modular architecture called ex ante modularity, from the other important benefits 
that will be discussed immediately, to be called interim modularity.   
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For tools that require ultimate performance like microlithography, it is extremely difficult to 
provide for ex ante modularity. This is because the tolerances of microlithography tools are much 
tighter than the ones for each key component. Indeed, each tool must be finally assembled and 
statically and dynamically fine-tuned by taking into account idiosyncrasies of the individual 
components in actual use. For example, despite their advanced modular architecture, ASML standard 
microlithography tools require (a) 4 to 10 days for final assembling, (b) another 20 to 30 days for 
customizing to chipmaker-specific specifications and (c) another 20 to 30 days after installation for 
final testing at the chipmakers’ sites. Thus, the length of time required to finalize ex ante specifications 
is roughly nine months from the initiation of an official order to the end of final testing. These three 
processes, (a), (b) and (c), require for Nikon (or Canon), respectively, 6 to 10 days (or 6 to 21 days), 40 
to 60 days (or 28 to 29 days) or 30 to 50 days.
34 
Reflecting the difficulty in attaining ex ante modularity, ASML and Philips have quite a solid 
relationship through mutually exclusive contracts. For example, ASML has continued frequent access 
to Philips’ research and development (R&D) resources in return for fees.
35 Besides, Philips has granted 
ASML “a worldwide, irrevocable, and non-exclusive license” under which ASML can use the 
(microlithography-related) patents owned by Philips without any charge. The two companies are also 
geographically located within easy driving distance.
36  In this sense, ASML and Philips can be 
considered to be virtually the same entity in terms of R&D activities, as well as corporate governance.  
 
Table 5. Extent of outsourcing at ASML 
                                                        
34 The requirement for one process for Canon in (c) is not available. The numbers in this context are for the year 2000. Regrettably, we 
cannot confirm whether or not the night shift is taken into account. 
35 From several US SEC documents (F-20). 
36 The main body of Philips is located at Eindhoven in the Netherlands, while ASML is located on a central street of the city of Veldhoven, 
only 20 minutes by car from Eindhoven. Philips Central Research Lab. is also located just several kilometers from ASML. Moreover, the 
semiconductor department of Carl Zeiss (Carl Zeiss SMT), which supplies the projection lens unit, is only about four hours away by car.  
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Major Components ASML Nikon Canon
Projection Lens
Development &
Design Zeiss In-House In-House











Ci ( T l )
In-House In-House








Assembling Philips・Group In-House In-House
Light Sources

























Zygo etc. Zygo etc.
Software
System Design In-House In-House In-House








Sources: based on author’s field research and various publicly available data 
 
Similar facts exist in the relationship between ASML and Zeiss. In fact, ASML and Zeiss have 
structured their relationship as an exclusive strategic alliance in the areas of product research, design, 
planning, manufacturing and pricing, as well as customer support and warranty services. ASML also 
provides various loans to Zeiss.
37 Among these loans is a non-interest-bearing loan that is to be repaid 
by Zeiss’s shipments of projection lenses to ASML.
38 Moreover, as in shown in Table 5, most of key 
                                                        
37 According to U.S. SEC document F-20, the (financial) loan to Zeiss equaled 48 percent of the total loans provided by ASML in 2001. 
38 From several U.S. SEC documents (F-20).  
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components like the stages, projection lenses, illumination and alignment systems are provided 
exclusively by Zeiss or Philips and their related subsidiaries. Accordingly, if ASML is counted as the 
ASML group ASML-Philips-Zeiss, the formal organizational difference between ASML and Nikon or 
Canon almost disappears. Thus, it is hard to argue that ASML is using ex ante modularity processes 
like (b) and (c) more effectively than Nikon or Canon.  
Then the question becomes, How is the advanced modular architecture embedded in ASML 
microlithography tools related to the phenomenal advances of ASML since the mid 1990s? The 
answer must be, Closely related. 
 
5.3 Resolving Complexity by interim Modularity 
Even confronted with complex phenomena, if one can discern a certain kind of basic structure 
among inextricably intertwined complexities, no matter how incomplete such a structure may be, one 
can avoid groping blindly in the dark and find some clue to untangling them. The more hierarchically 
visualized at a glance such a basic structure is, the more people start to discover the essence of those 
complex phenomena from the same perspective so that they can deeply understanding them. This is 
because such a basic structure can markedly increase the visibility of complex phenomena and because 
it serves as an effective communication tool among the people involved. In other words, Zuboffian 
“power of (information) panopticon” can be experienced.
39   
In this paper, we consider the power of panopticon to be another important benefit induced by 
ASML’s modular architecture. Such a power can be expected, no matter how incomplete the 
corresponding modular architecture is. In fact, the more intertwined the corresponding complexities 
are, the more strongly such an incomplete modular architecture can arouse such a power. In this paper, 
                                                        
39 See Zuboff,  1988.  
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we call this kind of power of panopticon induced by modular architecture interim modularity.
40  
In contrast to this interim modularity, ex ante modularity à la Baldwin and Clarke could be 
expected only if the corresponding modular architecture were almost perfect in that the total 
performance of final products specified at a system-design phase could automatically be assured as 
long as the performance of each key component were individually assured. Accordingly, ex ante 
modularity tends to be expected for mature technologies, such as IBM PCs. In the case of 
microlithography tools, however, which perpetually have to be dependent on highly advanced and 
undeveloped technologies, one cannot expect ex ante modularity. Such extremely complex tools 
require interim modularity as communication benefits to effectively orchestrate specialized knowledge 
and know-how dispersed over a wide range of professionals beyond corporate boundaries.  
 
5.4 Fujimoto’s Architecture Theory and interim Modularity 
According to Fujimoto (2001), product architecture can be classified in terms of “modular vs. 
integral architecture” and “open vs. closed architecture.” Modular architecture refers to the perfect 
modular architecture described in this paper, while integral architecture presupposes that the total 
performance of the final product needs post-assembly finetuning because it cannot be automatically 
guaranteed even if the performance of each key component is assured. Open architecture aims to 
standardize interfaces between final products and their related key components industrywide, while 
closed architecture aims to makes them proprietary for each manufacturer. 
After providing these definitions, Fujimoto maintains that, compared to their U.S. counterparts, 
                                                        
40 The concept of ex post modularity has quite a resemblance to the benefits of “protocols” proposed by Csete and Doyle (2002). They 
maintain that “If modules are ingredients, parts, components, subsystems, and players, then protocols describe the corresponding recipes, 
architectures, rules, interfaces, etiquettes, and codes of conduct. Protocols here are rules that prescribe allowed interfaces between modules, 
permitting system functions that could not be achieved by isolated modules. Protocols also facilitate the addition of new protocols and 
organizations into collections of mutually supportive protocol suites. Like modules, they simplify modeling and abstraction, and as such 
may often be largely  ‘in the eye of the beholder.’ A good protocol is one that supplies both robustness and evolvability.”   
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Japanese manufacturers tend to be more competitive in products with integral and closed architecture 
and less competitive in products with modular and open architecture. To borrow Fujimoto’s 
terminology, “Japan is good at integration while United States is good at combination.” According to 
Fujimoto’s definitions, microlithography tools are characterized by extremely integral and closed 
architecture. Nikon and Canon, however, have been facing really tough times with this kind of product. 
Thus, it appears that Fujimoto’s proposition needs to be modified and extended from a little different 
aspect. We believe that the interim  modularity concept can afford an important clue to such a 
seemingly inexplicable phenomenon. 
Although Fujimoto’s idea is insightful, it appears to be inadequate for understanding the 
characteristics of microlithography tools full of highly advanced complexity. In particular, it must be 
necessary to distinguish between the role of architecture embodied in finally commercialized products 
and the architecture working as a communication tool during trial-and-error processes used to search 
for the appropriate architectures or “protocols” in targeted finally commercialized products. 
Microlithography tools are characterized by extremely closed and integrated architecture when looked 
at as finally commercialized products. As was confirmed before, this is definitely true even for 
ASML’s tools. When looked at during architecture-searching processes, however, closed interfaces are 
apt to be stumbling blocks in seeking wisdom dispersed over a wide range of professionals inside and 
outside companies.  
 Accelerating wisdom-seeking speed desperately needs an efficient way of communicating 
among a wide range of professionals. To accomplish this, depending on interim modularity induced by 
modular architecture becomes inescapable, no matter how incomplete such architecture might be at an 
initial phase. The more efficiently such communication can be achieved, the more quickly the relevant 
architecture can be discovered and embodied in the corresponding finally commercialized products. 
The final architecture must undoubtedly be closed and integral, whereas the architecture utilized for 
searching must definitely be open to all the people involved, beyond corporate boundaries and  





6.  Interim Modularity: Backbone of ASML’s Competitiveness 
6.1  R & D Collaboration à la ASML with IMEC
41 
Unlike Nikon or Canon, ASML is involved only in system design and final assembly while 
depending on outside institutions like Zeiss, Philips and IMEC for R&D and parts assembling. So, 
how could ASML gain R&D capabilities that even surpass Nikon or Canon? Are there any prominent 
differences in R&D activities? 
One of the distinct differences between Nikon and Canon, on the one hand, and ASML, on the 
other, is that ASML has a long-standing close relationship with IMEC, as well as with Philips and 
Zeiss. In fact, most of ASML’s microlithography prototypes (called ß tools) were first installed at 
IMEC. Examples are the first generation KrF stepper in 1989, the second generation KrF scanner in 
1995, the first generation ArF scanner in 1999 and the first generation F2 scanner in 2004.
42 ASML 
and IMEC have also frequently exchanged personnel of various ranks. Furthermore, in the late 1990s, 
IMEC and Philips entered into a strategic R&D agreement. Consequently many researchers from 
Philips Research Laboratory have recently engaged in R&D activities at IMEC.
43 
In IMEC there are several ongoing semiconductor-related projects (called IIAP: IMEC 
Industrial Affiliation Program) on which researchers from various chip, tool and material 
manufacturers participate. ASML ß tools play key roles in these projects. Take, for example, the 
193nm Optical Lithography project, which commenced in 1999. For this project, IMEC (1 researcher), 
                                                        
41 IMEC (Interuniversity Micro Electronics Center), located in Leuven, Belgium, is said be the best European (and perhaps in the world) 
semiconductor process technology research institute. It was spun off from Leuven Catholic University in 1983. 
42 F2 scanners use an F2 eximer laser of 157nm wave length. This information comes from the author’s interview with the chief executive 
in charge of IMEC microlithography and the 1995 IMEC annual report. For further information on IMEC, please refer to the July 2004 
issue of Densi-Zairyo (“Materials for Electronics” in English: one of the prestigious Japanese trade journal). 
43 From IMEC 1999 annual report.  
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ASML (7 researchers), resist manufacturers (five companies: 17 researchers), a coater-developer 
manufacturer (2 researchers), chipmakers (five companies: 13 researchers) and a photomask 
inspection and adjustment manufacturer (2 researchers) were involved.
44 Among the chipmakers, such 
world-leading corporations as Intel, Infinion, Micron and Texas Instruments were included. The same 
goes for the tool and material manufacturers. 
As mentioned earlier, since the introduction of the full-scale implementation of RET, in order 
to increase the speed of innovation for microlithography tools, microlithography manufacturers must 
always have close collaborations with chip, tool and material manufacturers. ASML has very effective 
opportunities to brush up their ß tools through such close collaboration in various IIAPs at IMEC. It is 
also quite beneficial to the chip, tool and material manufacturers participating in the IIAPs to have 
relatively inexpensive and easy access to ASML ß tools. Resist manufacturers, for example, can use 
such ß tools to test their particular resist while it is under development. Moreover, if they want, they 
can privately retain their test results by exclusively using ASML’s ß tools for themselves. Results of 
some tests conducted by competitors are also made available via neutral IMEC coordinators within 
IIAPs; these results are quite useful for each participant as bench-mark data. The feedback from 
specific chipmakers can also be obtained, perhaps resulting in a bilateral contract between specific 
resist and chip manufacturers. In some cases, the resist produced by a specific manufacturer is 
recommended by the IMEC, leading to new markets.
45 
In distinct contrast to ASML, neither Nikon nor Canon has a place for resonance like IMEC. 
While it is not rare for Nikon or Canon to enter into bilateral strategic collaboration with specific chip, 
tool or material manufactures, these opportunities are quite limited in scope in comparison to what 
ASML has enjoyed at IMEC. To be sure, there have been seemingly IMEC-like R&D consortiums, 
                                                        
44 From IMEC 1999 annual report. 
45 All of these facts are based on the author’s interviews of a resist manufacturer that participates in various IIAPs.  







49 and  ASPLA,
50  in Japan, but none of them, has 
succeeded in reaching the efficiency level attained at IMEC, mainly because of their inefficient 
organizational design and IP protection mechanism.
51 
 













































6.2 R & D Collaboration through SPIE 
                                                        
46 Association of Super-Advanced Electronics Technology. 
47 Millennium Research for Advanced Information Technology. 
48 Semiconductor Technology Academic Research Center. 
49 Semiconductor Leading Edge Technology, Inc. 
50 Advanced SOC Platform Corporation. 
51 Information comes from interviews conducted by the author. For details, also see Kohzu and Chuma, 2004.  
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ASML’s awareness of the importance of interim modularity, more than Nikon’s or Canon’s, is 
reflected in the manner in which it uses SPIE conferences as another place for resonance. SPIE, which 
is one of the most prestigious scientific societies about microlithography in the world, has held a 
conference once a year for more than three decades. At this conference, microlithography 
manufacturers, lithographers and scientists from world-leading chipmakers have presented papers. The 
number of chipmaker presenters is generally much larger than the number of microlithography 
manufacturers. Lithographers and scientists from material manufacturers, EDA vendors, universities, 
or other research institutions have also presented papers or participated in this conference.  
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SPIE conferences can be very useful in getting valuable ideas from leading lithographers or 
scientists and receiving valuable comments from them,
52 and ASML has been using this conference 
more effectively than either Nikon or Canon. This observation can be supported indirectly by data 
shown in Figures 6 through 8, which plot the number of papers presented at SPIE conferences by 
ASML (group of ASML, Philips and Zeiss), Nikon or Canon between 1977 and 2004.
53 Because of 
the close relationship among ASML, Philips and Zeiss, we count papers submitted by these companies 
as ASML’s stand-alone papers. The vertical axis in these figures represents the number of papers 
presented while the horizontal axes (X, Y) represent the year the conference was held and the type of 
                                                        
52 This point is explicitly emphasized by ASML’s and Canon’s technologists as well as by leading development lithographers in SONY. 
53 The trend does not change if ASML is counted as a single entity, not as part of its group.  
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papers presented: stand-alone, with chip manufacturers, with material manufacturers, with others 
(especially R&D institutions), or with universities.  
We assume that the larger the number of stand-alone papers, the lower each company’s 
increasingly difficult for microlithography manufacturers to increase the speed of innovation without 
collaborating with various manufacturers or institutions. If the architecture embodied in 
microlithography tools is relatively more open and modular than the others during the development 
phase, it will be easier for outside scientists and engineers to understand the corresponding hardware 
and software structure deeply, making  their improvisations with inside scientists and engineers easier.  
According to Figure 6, ASML began to collaborate widely with chip, tool and material 
manufacturers in the mid 1990s, accelerating the pace of their collaboration in 1998. In contrast, 
although collaborations in Nikon and Canon tended to increase recently, the majority of their papers 
have been stand-alone (see Figure 7 and Figure 8). This tendency is particularly striking for Nikon 
(Figure 7). However, this tendency not to collaborate cannot be ascribed solely to Nikon or Canon, 
because Japanese chipmakers had not opened their development process technologies to tool 
manufacturers until recently. Thus, the recognition level of interim modularity may be much lower in 
Japanese chipmakers than in tool manufacturers. 
  Furthermore, it should be noted that ASML established an ASML Technology Development 
Center
54 in the United States in 1999 in order to extend its R&D activities in imaging technology and 
process integration. According to ASML’s leading technologist, ASML has been trying to collaborate 
closely with leading semiconductor-related manufacturers in finding specific solutions for these 
manufacturers. This center is also expected, as part of its R &D, to work with outsiders effectively to 
substantiate various novel but undeveloped ideas provided by leading semiconductor-related 
manufacturers (especially chipmakers) in SPIE.  
 
                                                        
54 This used to be called the U.S. Technology Development Center.  
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6.3 Collaborative Development Method of Embedded Control Software 
When the complexity of control software exceeds a certain threshold, the usefulness of interim 
modularity takes on prominence. Relationships between ASML and various Dutch universities or 
software venture companies exist for such situations. ASML has a long-established relationship with a 
group of Dutch universities in which TU/e (Technische Universiteit Eindhoven), located in the castle 
town of Philips (Eindhoven), constitutes the main strength. Such a relationship is evident from many 
of the master’s and doctoral theses executed in collaboration with ASML at TU/e’s engineering 
department.
55 According to the annual report by the TU/e engineering department, ASML awards 
have been granted to students with excellent academic records every year. In addition, it should be 
noted that TU/e has been one of the top universities for software engineering in Europe.
56  
A more noteworthy fact is that ASML recently introduced a novel software architecture based 
on UML (Unified Modeling language) from a fairly early period for the development of innovative 
dual-stage microlithography called TWINSCAN for 300 mm wafers (Gevers, 2000).
57 The use of 
UML allows one to identify the interdependencies of key microlithography modules under 
development at a fairly high level of abstraction. The most significant benefit of using UML is that it 
can provide power of panopticon for various kinds of engineers and scientists at a highly abstract level. 
The UML extended by ASML with TU/e can automatically connect to the advanced simulator (called 
χ model) developed by TU/e so that the optimum controllability of various parallel and/or sequential 
processing can be confirmed beforehand, even at a much lower abstract level (e.g., Albu, 2003). 
                                                        
55 The titles of some of these theses are “Improving throughput performance of Litho Cells at ASML: a simulation study with Arena” 
(2002), “Process dependency of level sensor: design of tools to investigate height process dependency in ASML PAS5500 and Twinscan 
Level Sensors” (2001), ”Design verification of the Twinscan Control Software” (2000), “Influence of reticle handling on TWINSCAN 
throughput”  (2000). For details, see http://library.tue.nl/catalog/Vubis.csp?OpacLanguage=eng. 
56 The information comes from a software engineering expert. Prof. Edsger W. Dijkstra (1930–2002), the world renowned proponent of 
structured programming, used to be a faculty member at TU/e. 
57 UML has recently become very popular in the world in relation to object-orientated programming (see D’Souza and Willis: 1998). Table 
1 in the previous section illustrates how Twinscan took complexity to another abstraction level compared to previous models.  
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Judging from the fact that the first commercialized TWINSCAN became available at the end 
of 2000, the control software development for TWINSCAN using UML might have started two to 
three years prior to that time. So, in developing the embedded control software, ASML started to enjoy 
the power of panopticon benefits derived by UML as early as around 1997 or 1998. There is nothing 
to suggest that either Nikon or Canon has started to employ the combination of ULM  plus the 
corresponding simulator in current models. 
Another project, a Dutch national venture called the Tangram Project, was launched mainly by 
the initiative of the TNO microlithography division in March 2003.
58  The main objective of this 
project is to collect all the wisdom of Dutch specialists in order to provide an innovative basic structure 
for the embedded-control software of ASML scanners that have evolved into extreme complexity. The 
project participants consist of TU/E, three other Dutch universities, TNO, Philips and software venture 
companies, as well as ASML.
59 Figuratively speaking, the situation is tantamount to one in which the 
University of Tokyo, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Osaka University, the National Institute of 
Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST), Toshiba, CSK and software TLOs
60 get 
together to develop the embedded-control software for Nikon’s state-of-the-art scanners. Unless the 
embedded software of Nikon’s scanners were hierarchically visible at a glance with considerable 
certainty, such an improvisation could not be successfully done at all.  
 
7. Conclusion and Implications 
This paper examined how Japanese science-based industry has been responding to its rapidly 
advancing complexity by focusing on the microlithography industry as a typical example. In this 
industry, Nikon and Canon were quite dominant until around the mid 1990s. ASML of the 
                                                        
58 The Ideals Project, a joint venture of ASML, TU/e and other universities, designed to replace built-in software for ASML scanners with 
object-orientated software also began in 2003. For details, see Onvlee  et al., 2003. 
59 For further details, see http://www.embeddedsystem.nl/ . 
60 Technology Licensing Organizations.  
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Netherlands, however, began to increase its competitive strength rapidly in the mid 1990s, and these 
three companies are currently engaged in a fierce dead-heat competition. ASML appears to have a 
slight lead in terms of speed of innovation, even in the state-of-the art lithography tools. The objective 
of this paper was to answer to the following questions: Why has the global market share in the 
microlithography market been reversed? What kinds of factors mainly influence such a reversal? How 
extensively are such factors generalizable to other kinds of science-based industries, beyond the 
microlithography industry? What kinds of additional measures are desirable for vertically integrated 
corporations like Nikon or Canon? 
The analysis indicated that in response to the increasing demand for miniaturization in 
submicron order, due to Moore’s law, a new technology called RET (Resolution Enhancement 
Technology) was created, which--together with DUV steppers--aroused the revolutionary wave in the 
mid 1990s. RET made it possible to print IC patterns in a photomask onto a silicon wafer at less than 
half the wavelength. Although the introduction of RET opened a new frontier for microlithography 
tools, at the same time manufacturers began to experience quite complex problems that they had not 
confronted previously. As the situation became more complicated, finding root causes that lead to 
imprecise printing accuracy became more and more difficult, so that it became necessary for 
microlithography manufacturers to collaborate with leading chipmakers and tool, photomask, material 
and/or EDA software manufacturers beyond their corporate boundaries. It was at about this period that 
ASML made great leaps ahead. 
Unlike Nikon or Canon, ASML seems to be involved only in system design and final 
assembly while depending on outside institutions, like Philips, Zeiss, TNO and IMEC, for R&D and 
key component assembly. Accordingly, at first glance, it is hard to understand how ASML could gain 
such high R&D capabilities that surpass even Nikon’s or Canon’s. Our research has clarified this issue. 
ASML is, in fact, a huge industrial complex with Philips, Zeiss, IMEC and TNO intricately combined 
with ASML by various kinds of exclusive contracts. Moreover, the organizational form of such a  
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complex is itself thoroughly contemporary, compared with the traditional vertically integrated forms 
of  Nikon or Canon, in that the corporate boundaries are quite flexible and porous so as effectively to 
orchestrate dispersal of specialized knowledge and know-how over a wide range of professionals 
inside and outside the complex. In this complex, an Open Innovation à la Chesbrough (2003) can be 
implemented relatively easily. This point can be best exemplified by the fact that ASML has been 
benefiting from having exclusive access to IMEC, the world famous R&D consortium, where ASML 
can have an effective place for resonance, through her β tools, with a number of world-leading chip, 
tool and material manufacturers.  
The second important difference between ASML and its Japanese counterparts is related to the 
modular architecture embodied in ASML’s various microlithography tools. To be sure, tolerances of 
microlithography tools are much tighter than the tolerances for each key component and so the 
corresponding architecture must be extremely closed and integral, even for ASML’s tools when seen 
as finally commercialized products. Such a closed and integral nature tends, however, to be a big 
stumbling block for extremely complex microlithography tools because establishing the relevant 
system architecture at the initial development phase becomes more and more difficult. In other words, 
the relevant architecture per se has to be sought beyond corporate boundaries even during the 
development processes. The necessity for such border transgression has been particularly high since 
the mid 1980s when RET, together with DUV steppers and scanners, became indispensable. 
In finding such an effective architecture, ASML tends to behave more efficiently than Nikon 
or Canon. To do that, ASML pays more explicit attention to the importance of interim modularity. The 
concept of interim modularity was defined in this paper as the communication benefits induced by 
modular architecture during the trial-and-error development processes, no matter how incomplete such 
architecture may be. Extremely complex tools like microlithography require interim  modularity 
effectively to orchestrate specialized knowledge and know-how dispersal over a wide range of 
professionals inside and outside of corporations. This paper illustrated, based on data describing  
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ASML’S collaboration in SPIE and ASML’s development methods for embedded control software, 
the fact that ASML is more effective in pursuing and responding to the importance of interim 
modularity than  Nikon or Canon.  
As stated at the beginning of this paper, waves of scientific and technological innovations are 
constantly bombarding various fields at astonishing rates. This trend is particularly prominent in the 
science-based industries, where, in order to harness information-processing capabilities of the right 
people in the right places, the full-scale organizational management becomes indispensable over a 
wide range of related areas. To achieve this communication an organization must pursue interim 
modularity, which can be effectively implemented only in the highly visualized organizations where 
both the rapidly changing circumstances and the appropriate knowledge are hierarchically visible at a 
glance and effectively shared by the people involved, with considerable certainty. It is here that various 
limits of organization have shown up in many Japanese firms, as well as in Nikon or Canon, primarily 
because discontinuously enhancing visibility tends inevitably to entail serious conflicts of interest at 
various hierarchical layers.  
To be sure, one strength of the Japanese manufacturing industry has traditionally been its 
abundance of people with tacit specialized and integrated knowledge that spans a wide range of areas 
within each division or corporation. Those people are still relatively abundant, but the increasing 
complexity observed in science-based industries yields new problems that those people can no longer 
cope with effectively by only using their knowledge in stand-alone mode. This is mainly because the 
range of optimization has been rapidly expanding far beyond the traditional knowledge boundaries so 
that, without enhancing the compatibility of their tacit knowledge for networking, the scarcity itself 
could no longer be maintained as it was. Establishing such compatibility, however, is quite a difficult 
job because the new type of integrated knowledge must be newly accumulated at a higher abstract 
level. Moreover, making the tacit knowledge explicit tends to invoke serious conflicts of interest at 
various hierarchical layers. Many Japanese corporations that have an abundance of specialized and  
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integrated knowledge below a desirable abstract level appear to be behind in setting up an efficient 
mechanism to create such a new abstraction level of integrated knowledge. This challenge appears to 









Appendix: Corporate Governance à la ASML
61 
In Europe, and in particular in the Netherlands where ASML is based, attempts have been 
made to expand the degree of freedom for executive boards by “articles of association” to mitigate the 
enforceability of corporate law. Similar freedom began to be guaranteed in Japan in November 2001. 
These differences in corporate law might have induced a significantly different style of corporate 
governance between ASML and Nikon or Canon. 
ASML Holding NV (Naamloze Vennootschap), which is the parent entity of ASML, could 
issue so-called classified stocks, such as Priority Stocks (PS) or Preference Stocks (PRS). Classified 
stockholders may be entitled to various types of voting rights, residual rights, dividends, and so forth. 
ASML’s articles of association also stipulate that the Priority Stock Foundation (PSF) would be 
composed of three ASML outside board members and two ASML board members and could impose 
considerable restrictions over the voting power of general shareholders’ meetings. Furthermore, a 
Preference Stock Foundation (PRSF) could be formed at any time, as the occasion demands. It would 
                                                        
61 I owe much to Joost van Acht, who came to Hitotsubashi University as a master’s student of research in an exchange program from 
Erasmus University in the Netherlands. I wish to take this opportunity to acknowledge his contribution and thank him. Much of the 
contents of this section were based on information taken from the ASML U.S. SEC documents (February 18, 2003). The author wishes to 
take this opportunity to acknowledge his contribution and thank him.  
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be composed of three members from the Dutch business and university sectors and ASML’s outside 
board chairperson. The PRFS could serve as a significant safeguard for board members if a third-party 
takeover is attempted, because the board members are legally authorized to issue PRS shares equal to 
the number of ordinary shares outstanding and to give PRS and PRSF a priority option to purchase 
shares at a low price (book value), provided both the outside board meeting and PSF approve such 
action. 
Thus, ASML board members are assured of more operational and organizational freedom than 
Nikon or Canon board members. Furthermore, they have the privilege of having managerial 
prerogatives for the aforementioned exclusiveness that are necessary for science-based industries. Of 
course, to discourage a self-approving attitude of board members, the outside boards are granted a 
powerful right for monitoring them. This function virtually does not exist in Japan.  
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